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THE ATTRIBUTIONAL "DOUBLE STANDARD":
ACTOR-OBSERVER DIFFERENCES IN PREDICTING THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS'
Barry R. Schlenker
University of Florida
Thom11 V. Bonoma
University of Pittsburgh
Donelson R. Forsyth
University of Florida

It was hypothesized that subjects who took the role of intnanion obsnvc-rs ratlwr than a<"
tors would predic t a closer relatio nship b e tween a ttitudc.•s a nd l><·haviors and would report
greater confidence in behavio ral predic tions d e rivable from an anor's attitu~k statc·1~c-1m .
One hundred sixty-eight subje cts assumed the role of e ither actor or ohs<· n ·n in sn·nanos of
group interaction s in which a central p e rson made a statemt•nt about a parti<·ular allituck ob·
ject. As predicted , subjects in the observer r o le reportrd that sprcifir futurr lwha\·iorli lt•.g . .
loaning money, helping to study for a test) had a greater likelihood of tK«Urrt·m·r following an
attitude statement (e.g., "I like Pat') than did subjects in th<> actor rolr. and ohsrrwr~ wrrr
more confident than a ctors in these predictio n s. In additio n . th<> favorability of the attitudr
statement was directly rel a ted to the strength of predictions. and the central person's
familiarity with the audience was direc tly r ela t ed to confidence in prt>diniom,. Obser"·ers ap·
parently view attitude statements as reliable indications of internal dispositions that serve as a
potential "cause" of subsequent behavio rs , while a c tors view attitude statements as tenuous
orientations that can be modified in a ccord with future situational contingencies.

Jones and Nisbett (1971) proposed that actors are disposed to locate the
cause of their behavior in the environment , while observers attribute the
same behavior to stable traits possessed by the actor. In explanation, Jones
and Nisbett hypothesized that these divergent attributions could be the
result of (a) differences in access to knowledge of past behavior and internal states, since actors should be more aware of their own inconsistencies
across situations and the compelling pressures of environmental influences:
(b) perceptual information processing, since the focus of attention for tht
actor may be on the environment while for the observer it may be on the
acto_r's behavior; and (c) self-esteem protection, since actors may be
motivated to attribute the cause of undesirable behaviors to the environ·
ment rather than the self.
1
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The supporting evidence cited by Jones and Nisbett Qones & Harris,
1967: Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968; McArthur, 1972 ;
Nisbett. Caputo, Legant, & Maracek, 1973) has been buttressed by more
reccm investigations which have attempted to define the necessary and sufficiem conditions under which the actor-observer divergence may occur.
For example. Storms ( 1973) used videotapes of "get acquainted" conversations which were playc•d hack to actors and matched observers. The typical
actor-observer diffrrences were obtained when subjects were shown a tape
of rhc pcrspcnivc rhcy had already witnessed. These differences were
n·n·rsed , however . when subjects were shown a tape of the opposite
pt·rsp<'nivc (i.e .. observers viewed a tape from the actor's perspective while
anors vicw<'d a rape of the observer's perspective).
This reversal of the actor-observn difference has been replicated in
st'\Tral otlwr studi<•s (e.g .. Arkin & Duval, 1975; Miller, 1975 , Experiment 4;
Taylor & Fiske . 1975) . [n general, the research te nds to support the condusion that tlw divcrgcnc.·c is in large part due to the different perspectives
of tht· individuals in the situation. However , Regan and Totten (1975)
point out that studiC's such as Storms (1973) and Taylor and Fiske ( 1975)
arc confounded since' the perspective shift must naturally include an object iv<· information increase as well . In the process of shifting the observers'
frKus of att<·ntion to the situation and the actors' focus to themselves, the
manipulation gave subjects additional environmental and personal information that was not formerly available .
Regan and Totten attempted to alleviate this problem by manipulating
hoth pnspt>nive shift and information increase, again through the use of
vidc•otaped "get acquainted" sessions. Observers were given either standard
ohs<'rver instructions or an empathic set modeled after Stotland's (I 969)
"imagine him" directions. Their results indicated that the attributions of
empathic observers were more situational and less dispositional than the
attributions of nonempathic observers , supporting the hypothesis that a
perceptual focus of attention largely determines attributions. This
r<'s<·a rch is complemented by a study performed by Duval and Wicklund
( 1973). who found that objectively self-aware actors' (self-focused) attributions were relatively less situational and more dispositional than the attributions made by subjectively self-aware actors (situation -focused) .
These' results suggest that for both actors and observers, the perspective
(focus of attention) one assumes is sufficient to determine whether attributions arc made lo the actor or the environment. But unless som<>thing is
done w alter one's characteristic focus of attention (e.g., inducing objective self-awareness. employing empathy instructions) , actors attend to
situational aspects while observers attend to the actor's dispositions.
Interestingly. the perspective hypothesis could indirectly bear on the
long-standing controversy of whether and / or when a person's attitudes will
affect subsequent behavior (e.g., Bern, 1972; Festinger, 1964; LaPiere,
I 934: Wicker, I 969) . It has been argued both that attitudes are largely irrelC'vant to the prediction of situation-specific behaviors and that attitudes
are important , though not the only, causes of behaviors (e.g., Fishbein &
Ajzen, I 975: Snyder & Swann , 1975). Correlations between attitudes and
behaviors are generally small, but often significant, across a variety of
situations and studies, lending some degree of empirical support to both
positions and no critical verdict for either. The perspective one takes in ex109

cogitating about the issue could play more than a minor role in how on<describes the attitude-behavior relationship. The perspective hypothesis
implies that ( l) actors characteristically hold a more t<'nuous view of rht·
relationship of their cognitive structures to possible actions than do
observers, and (2) a kind of attributional " double standard" may be in ef.
feet, where actors are willing to " discount" the certainty of their own
attitude -behavior links , but fail to make the same discount wlwn in rhe
role of observing another. Actors, typically focused on the t•rwironmem.
should tend to view their own attitude statements as only tentati\'t· ori<'nta ·
tions toward the world, orientations which mzght be implemenrcd if "all
other things were equal" or "nothing came up ," but definitely not as in ·
variant internal indicators of disposition which (·ause any specific bd1avior
as a necessary and sufficient condition. Attitude -reh·vant futur<' behaviors
would be seen by the actor as highly affected by future situational <·on ·
tingencies . Obse rvers , typically focused on the actor. should p<-rform no
such situational discounting, but should view an actor's au it ud<'slat<·mrnts as
at least partial evidence of an internal disposition that will <·aus<' subs<"
quent b ehaviors consistent with the statement to occur. Thus. following an
attitude stateme nt such as " I like John ," observers should predict that thr
actor would be willing to loan John money, want to go to th<' movi<"s with
him , help him to study for tests , and so on, and have high confidence in
the accuracy of their predictions. Actors should int<'rpr<'t th<' statement
differently; they should feel that these specific behaviors arc not as likely to
occur , since they would depend upon the future situation, and would hav<'
less confidence in whatever predictions they do make. Although several
studies have examined the relationship between dispositional trait auribu·
tions and predictions of future behaviors (e .g., Gurwitz & Panciera, 1975;
Langer & Roth, 1975; Miller, 1975; Nisbett, et al., 1973 ; Snyder &
Frankel, 1976), the present study tested the generality of an attributional
double standard as a judgmental bias under predictive attitude-behavior
conditions.
Subjects read scenarios d escribing an interaction among several people.
The central person in each made a statement about an attitude object, and
subjects were asked (a) to predict the likelihood that the central person
would respond in specific ways toward the object and (b) to indicate their
confidence in their predictions. The major independent variable
manipulation was the role that subjects were asked to assume. Half were
given standard observer instructions , while the remainder were told to imag£ne yourself actually sayz"ng and doz"ng the things being attributed to you.
The latter actor instructions seem to go beyond standard manipulations of
empathy which simply ask subjects to evaluate the situation from the
perspective of another person. It was hypothesized that subjects who
assumed the role of the central person (actors) would predict a smaller
likelihood of occurrence of the specific behaviors and would have less confidence in their predictions than would subjects who assumed the role of
observers . If such effects occur under conditions where actors and
observers are given identical objective information and where the
described behaviors are not undesirable, it would provide strong support
for the conclusion that neither self-esteem protection nor differential ac·
cess to objective information are necessary for the occurrence of actorobserver differences (possible subjective differences in these factors will be
discussed later) .
110

Additionally , the scenarios contained variations in the favorability of the
atticude statement (e .g ., "I like John" versus "I like John more than anyone
else") and in the familiarity of the other group members to the central person. Both statement favorability and audience familiarity were
hypothesized to increase the strength and confidence of behavioral predictions. People should learn to associate highly favorable statements with
greater commitment toward the attitude object; people typically do not
praise something unless they are committed in some way to it. Thus, the
more favorable the attitude statement, the more it should be seen as an important personal disposition that should affect behavior. Audience
familiarity .should also be an important context variable. When interacting
with unfamiliar others, attitude statements could serve more of an impression management function than an expressive function , and hence be seen
as less revealing of one's " true" feelings. The statement might be seen
merdy as a way of currying favor with the unfamiliar audience or fitting in
with the group. Thus, audience familiarity should affect the amount of
perceived external pressure placed on the central person to make a particular statement. People should infer that the attitude statement is more
rt"flective of underlying attitude strength when external pressure is low
(familiar audience) rather than high (unfamiliar audience) (Bern, 1972).
Further. attitude statements are more committing when they are made
before friends rather than casual acquaintances. People should expect
continued interaction with and monitoring by friends , and therefore say
only what they really mean . Lastly, subjects responded to two different
scenarios, one involving statements made about another person and one
involving statements made about a political party. Though speculations
could be advanced about possible effects of a personal versus extrapersonal
attitude object, no specific predictions were made. The different scenarios
were included to assess generalizability of the results.

Method

Subjects
One hundred and sixty-eight male and female introductory psychology
students. 21 per cell of the four-factor mixed-design, participated to partially fulfill a course requirement .

Procedure
Subjects were run in groups, with booklets from different conditions
randomly distributed within each group. To increase the generality of the
interpretation, each booklet contained two short scenarios about different
kinds of attitude objects. One referred to a central actor making a statement about another person (personal attitude object) and the other
referred to a central actor making a statement about a political party (extrapersonal attitude object). The instructions for each booklet emphasized
that subjects were to imagine either that they were the central person or
that they were observing the central person. Within each scenario, the
statement made by the central person expressed either moderate or high
favorability to the attitude object and was made before a group of people
111

who were either well-known or little known. Hence, the design contained
three between-subjects factors- respondent perspective (actor vs.
observer), attitude favorability (high vs. moderate), and audience
familiarity (high vs. low)-and·one within-subjects factor - attitude object
(personal vs. extrapersonal). Subjects were asked to carefully read the writ ·
ten instructions and proceed as directed, answering questions about each
scenario that appeared in the booklet. When finished, subjects were
thanked for their participation and permitted to leave.

Materials
The two short scenarios briefly described an interaction among several
people, one of whom made an attitude-relevant statement. In the
personal-attitude-object scenario, a group was said to be discussing people
whom they all know, and the name "Pat" popped up in the conversation.
(Pat and the central person were described to be of the subject's own sex.
and Pat was said not to be present during the discussion group). The cen·
tral person then expressed a favorable attitude toward Pat. In the
extrapersonal-attitude-object scenario, the topic of "politics and political
parties" was brought up in the group, and a discussion began. The central
person then expressed a favorable attitude toward "party X." All subjects
received both scenarios, with the order of presentation counterbalanced.
In the actor condition, the written instructions that preceded the two
scenarios asked subjects to "imagine that you are in the group being
described. Imagine that you actually are talking and listening to what is
being said" and "that you are saying what is being attributed to you." The
scenarios employed the word "you" throughout , and emphasized that
"you" made the statements that concerned Pat and party X . In the
observer condition, the written instructions asked subjects to "imagine that
you are observing the group being described but are not participating in
the discussion ." The central person was designated by initials, e.g., T.N ..
thus allowing the actor and observer scenarios to be identical except for the
substitution of phrases such as "T.N. makes the following statement" or
"you make the following statement."
Familiarity of the audience was varied by either stating that individuals
in the group knew one another very well (high familiarity) or that the
group members were merely acquaintances who had gotten together for
one of the first times (low familiarity). Favorability toward the attitude object was varied by the appropriate use of modifiers. For example, when
discussing Pat, moderate favorability actors stated, "I like Pat. We have a
fairly good time when we're together. Pat is one of the nicer people I
know." High favorability actors, on the other hand, stated, "I really like
Pat.,very much. We have a great time whenever we're together. Pat is one
of the greatest people I know."
The following example was the scenario used for the actor/highfamiliarity I moderate-£avorabilityI extrapersonal-attitude-object condi·
tion:
During lunch one day, you are talking with several friends and ~c
quaintances. You know these people very well. At one point dunng
the conversation one of the people in the group brings up the topic of
politics and political parties, and a discussion begins. During the
.ll~

conversation, you make the following statement: "I've been a
member of party X for some time now. I've tried to examine all the
issues carefully, and I firmly believe that the positions the party takes
are in the best interests of the country. I've given the party my
wholehearted support in the past and I'll definitely continue to do so
in the future."

Dependent Variables
Each scenario was followed by nine questions. Two of the items were
checks on the familiarity and commitment manipulations. Six of the items
asked subjects to make specific predictions concerning future behaviors
that could be related to the attitude object. For example, when the attitude object was personal, subjects were asked questions such as "How
likely would you (T.N.) be to give time to help Pat study for a test?" and
'"How willing would you (T.N.) be to loan Pat money?" When the attitude
object was extrapersonal, subjects were asked questions such as "How likely
is it that you (T.N.) would contribute time for door-to-door campaigning
on behalf of party X during the next elecction?" and "How likely is it that
you (T.N.) would make a monetary contribution to party X during the
next election?" Wherever possible, as in the above, items were equated in
asking for time, money, etc. Other items asked for the likelihood of such
occurrences as having a change of opinion or saying something negative
about the attitude object. Finally, subjects were asked how confident they
were of the correctness of their answers. Each of the nine items was
followed by a 3 7 -point scale marked with 7 verbal labels ranging from "not
at all" to "extremely."

Results
Manipulation Checks
Both the familiarity and favorability manipulations were successful.
Subjects in the high-familiarity condition (M = 22. 7) felt that the group
members liked one another more, F{l , 160)= 50.193, p <.01, than did
subjects in the low-familiarity condition (M= 17.4). Subjects in the high·
favorability condition (M = 29.6) felt that the central person was m;,re
favorable toward the attitude object, F{l ,160)= 34.780, p<.Ol, than did
subjects in the moderate-favorability conditions (M= 25.6).

Predictions of Future Behavior
A four-factor, repeated measures analysis of variance was performed on
the sum of subjects' responses to the six behavior predictions that followed
each scenario. Main effects of both perspective, F(l, 160) = 5.349, p <.05,
and favorability , F(I, 160) = 8.037, p <.01, were obtained. Supporting the
major hypothesis , subjects believed that the central person was more likely
to engage in attitude-relevant behaviors when they were in the role of
observers rather than actors; means were 151.5 and 142.9, respectively.
The favorability main effect indicated that subjects who had read the
high-favorability statements believed that the attitude.• relevant behaviors
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were more likely to occur than subjects who had read moderare·
favorability statements; means were 152 .4 and 141.9, respe(·tivdy. No
other significant effects were obtained on the summed behavioral
predictions.

Confidence in Predictions
Analysis of subjects' responses to the question. "How confident an· you
of your answers to the above questions?" (the item followed thr- six
behavioral prediction measures) revealed main effects due to pcnpt'Clivt',
F(l , 160) = 12 . 191, p < .01 , and group familiarity. F( 1.160) = 4.285.
p < .05, and a three-way interaction between favorability . perspective. and
attitude object, F(l, 160) = 4 .552, p <.05 . As predicted , subjects who
assumed the role of actors were less confident of their predictioru than sub·
jects who assumed the role of observers; means were 23.2 and 26 .5. rt"Sp«·
tive ly. Additionally, subjects were less confident of their attributions wht'n
there was low-familiarity of the group members than when there was high·
familiarity; means were 23.9 and 25.8, respectively .
Means for the three-way interaction are presented in Table 1. Ob~rver·
subjects were highly confident of their predictions irrespective of tht
degree of favorability expressed or the attitude object being described by
the statement. The confidence of actor-subjects, on the other hand, was
affected by both favorability and the attitude object, with actor-subjects
expressing more confidence under high rather than moderate·favorability
when the attitude object was personal; t(160) = 1.99, p < .05 (two-tailed).

TABLEl
Mean Ratings of Confidence
in Attributions

Condition
Attitude Object

Personal
Extra personal

Actor Role

0 bserver Role

Moderate
Favor·
ability

High
Favorability

Moderate
Favor·
ability

High
Favor·
ability

21.8
23 .8

25.0
22 .3

26.6
26.7

26.2
26.5

Discussz"on
The results clearly supported the major hypotheses that (a) observers are
more willing than actors to assume that specific behaviors follow from an
attitude statement, and (b) observers have greater confidence than actors

in predictions that are made about behaviors. Observers were apparently
more wiJling to assume that an attitude statement reflects an underlying
disposition that affects future behaviors , while actors apparently viewed
the attitude statements more as an orientation toward the attitude object
than as an inflexible linkage with the attitude object. There is thus some
justification for asserting that some attributional " double standard"
operates with generality not only in postdictive estimations of the attitudebehavior relationship . but also in predictive forecasts of the strength of this
relationship.
The attitude-favorability and audience-familiarity manipulations pro·
duced effects that were generally consistent with the hypotheses.
Favorability was directly related to subjects' behavioral predictions ·- highly favorable attitude statements were seen as more likely to lead
to specific behaviors than were less favorable statements. However, predictive confidence was affected by the interaction of favorability, perspective,
and auitude object. Favorability did not affect observers' confidence
ratings. and only affected actors' confidence ratings toward the personal
attitude object. Perhaps an extreme statement about another person, as
opposf'd to an extrapersonal object, produces greater perceived social
pressure to live up to the statement's behavioral implications. Such an extreme personal statement might even be perceived by the actor as a sort of
promise which must be fulfilled. Thus, actors' confidence ratings increase
for whatever behavioral implications seem to follow an extreme personal
statement.
Audience familiarity affected confidence in the hypothesized direction ,
with high familiarity producing greater confidence than low familiarity.
However, familiarity did not affect behavioral predictions. Apparently,
the favorability of an attitude statement primarily serves to delineate the
behaviors which should follow from it, while the context of the situation
(familiarity) only affects one's confidence in making these predictions.
Why such a separation occurred between behavioral implications and con·
fidence is unclear . Perhaps the specificity is due to the logical ramifications
of the variables. People may first decide what behavioral implications exist; the more extreme the statement, the greater the implications. When
they evaluate their confidence, though, they look to situational pressures
which may have constrained the statement, e.g ., was it made to friends or
strangers? The fact that subjects rated the implications first and then their
predictive confidence might have reinforced such a two-step process.
Future research will be needed to explore the specificity effect.
The procedure used in the present experiment was successful in
producing actor-observer differences despite the control of both objective
information and motivation. Several possible explanations exist for these
differences. The first, a derivative of the different-histories hypothesis
Qones & Nisbett, 1971), suggests that actors may have compared the
descriptions of the central character with their own recalled past
behaviors. The comparison may have led them to conclude that the
depicted attitude statements were atypical of their own, so that any future
behavior would be less likely to be linked to them . Given the nature of the
attitude statements which were used, this seems unlikely; it would be rare
to find a college student who has not made comparable statements at one
or another tim~ . Or, the actors may have recalled comparable personal
115

statements and remembered that few behaviors followed. However, if few
behavioral implications actually do follow all actors' attitude statements,
why would observers predict more such effects and have higher confidence
in their ratings? Observers should be equally able to recall that people do
not follow their words with deeds. However, it is impossible to rule out ex·
planations based on such privately conjured information or motivation
differences.
The overall pattern of results would seem to provide strong support for
the perspective hypothesis. Causes of behaviors are attributed to the most
salient element of the perceptual field (Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Pryor &
Kriss, 1977; Wegner & Finstuen, 1977). Actors typically focus on the en·
vironment, obtaining adaptive information useful in planning behavioral
contingencies. Observers typically focus on the actor, obtaining adaptive
information that is useful in understanding and predicting what the actor
will do. Such functional differences in focus allow people to best fulfill
their goals in social situations.

References
Arkin, R. M., & Duval, S. Focus of attention and causal attributions of
actors and observers. journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1975.
11, 427-438.
Bern, D. J. Self-perception theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 6) . New York: Academic Press.
1972.
Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. Effects of objective self-awareness on attri·
bution of causality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973.
9, 17-31.
Festinger, L. Behavioral support for opinion change. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 1964, 28, 404-417.
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975.
Gurwitz, S. B . , & Panciera, L. Attributions of freedom by actors and
observers. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32,
531-539.
Jones, E. E., & Harris, V. A. The attribution of attitudes. journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 1967, 3, 1-24.
Jones, E. E . , & Nisbett, R. E. The actor and the observer: Divergent
perceptions of the causes of behavior. Morristown, N. J.: Genera\
Learning Press, 1971.
Jones, E. E., Rock, L., Shaver, K. G., Goethals, G. R., & Ward, L. M.
Patterns of performance and ability attribution: An unexpected
primacy effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968,
10, 317-340.
Langer, E . J., & Roth, J. Heads I win, tails it's chance: The illusion of con·
trol as a function of sequence of outcomes in a purely chance task.
journal of Personalt'ty and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 951-955.
LaPiere, R. T. Attitudes vs. action. Social Forces, 1934, 13, 230-237.
McArthur, L. A. The how and the what of why: Some determinants a~d
consequences of causal attribution. journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 1972, 22, 171-193.
116

Miller. A. G. Accor and observer perceptions of the learning of a task.
journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 95 -111.
Nisbeu. R . E . . Capuco. C .. Legant, P. , & Maracek, J. Behavior as seen
by che acwr and as seen by the observer. journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1973, 27, 154-164.
Pryor. J. B . . & Kriss , M. The cognitive dynamics of salience in the attriburion process. journal of Personality and Sodal Psychology, 1977, 35,
49· 55.
Regan, D. T .. & Torcen, J. Empathy and attribution: Turning observers
into actors . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32,
850-856.
Snyder. M . L.. & Frankel, A . Observer bias: A stringent test of behavior
t"ngulfing ch<· fi<·ld.journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1976 ,
J4, 857 ·864 .
Snydt"r , M . , & Swann, W . B. When actions reflect attitudes: The politics
of impression management. journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1976, 34, 1034 -1042.
Storms. M. D . Videotape and the attribution process: Reversing actors'
and obsC'rvC'rs' points of view.journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1973 , 27, 165-175.
Stotland. E. Exploratory investigations of empathy. In L. Berkowitz (Ed .),
Advances in experi"mental social psychology (Vol. 4). New York:
Academic Press, 1969.
Taylor. S. E .. & Fiske , S. T. Point of view and perceptions of causality.
journal of Personalz"ty and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 439-445.
Wegner. D . M .. & Finstuen, K. Observers' focus of attention in the simulation of self-perception . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
1977 . 35, 56-62.
Wicker, A. W. Attitudes versus actions: The relationship of verbal and
overt behavioral responses to attitude objects. journal of Socz'al Issues,
1969, 2.5, 41-78.

117

